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COPYRIGHT AND MORALS
"The statistics of crime are property to the same
extent as any other statistics, even if collected by a
criminal who furnishes some of the data." Mr. Justice
Holmes in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 198 U. S. 251.
T HE basis for national copyright legislation in this country is
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution: "The Congress shall
have power * * * to promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors, the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
To be entitled to copyright protection, therefore, there must be
the writing of an author which will promote the progress of science
and useful arts. What is a writing, and who is an author, have been,
in the past, the cause of much dispute, but the limitation that the
writing of an author must promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts, opens up a field of ingenious inquiry and gives the courts
an opportunity to indulge in refinements and speculations which
probably would surprise the draftsmen of the Constitution.
Of course a work utterly useless and worthless would not pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, but outside of obvious
limits it is dangerous for persons trained only in the law to pro-
nounce upon such matters. Otherwise, at one extreme, some works
of genius would be sure to miss appreciation, at the other end, copy-
right would be denied to~works which appealed to a public less edu-
cated than the judge.' Manifestly an immoral work is not one which
promotes the progress of science and useful arts. But it is when
the courts attempt to determine what is or what is not immoral that
some of the finest gems of judicial literature are to be found. There
can be no quarrel with the generalization, but when an individual
undertakes to determine whether or not a particular book, play, or
picture is immoral, the result is seldom edifying and is often amus-
ing.
For the purpose of this discussion, morality, in so far as it ap-
plies to literary or artistic works, can be divided generally. (a)
Where the work offends public order, and (b) where it offends pub-
lic decency.
I Mr. Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson, x88 U. S. 239.
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(a) Does the zork offend public order?
Thig includes an inquiry whether it is seditious, blasphemous,
libelous or fraudulent. In earlier days when government controlled
all printing, and when licensing acts were enacted and enforced, it is
not surprising that judges sat not only as courts in determining
controversies brought before them, but as censors of the books in-
volved in those controversies. It sometimes happened that works
which were sought to be protected as against piracy were sometimes
condemned as against morals. To show the attitude of courts in the
eighteenth century we have only to read Lord High Chancellor
Parker's observations in Burnett v. Chetwood.2 "This being a book
which to his knowledge (having read it in his study) contained
strange notions intended by the author to be concealed from the
vulgar in the Latin tongue, in which language it could not do much
hurt, the learned being better able to judge of it, he thought it proper*
to grant an injunction to the printing and publishing it in English;
that he lookt upon it that this court had a superintendency over all
books, and might in a summary way restrain the printing or publish-
ing any that contained reflections on religion or morality." This is
a refurn to the methods of the Star Chamber and High Commis-
sion, indeed, and is a highly dangerous view for any court to take.
What Milton said of the licensers of his time could appropri-
ately be applied. "* * * how shall the licencers themselves be con-
fided in, unless we can conferr upon them, or they assume to them-
selves above all others in the Land, the grace of infallibility, and un-
corruptedness? And again if it be true, that.a wise man like a good
refiner can gather gold out of the drossiest volume, and that a fool
will be a fool with the best book,'yea or without book, there is no
reason that we should deprive a wise man of any advantage to his
wisdome, while we seek to restrain from a fool, that which being
restrain'd will be no hindrance to his folly." * * * "It cannot be
deny'd but that he who is made judge to sit upon the birth, or death
of books whether they may be wafted into this world, or not, had
need to be a man above the common measure, both studious, learned,
and judicious; there may, be else no mean mistakes in the censure
of what is passable or not; which is also no mean injury.
' '
The cases which hold that a copurt of equity, as a preliminary to
protection against infringement, should inspect and censor the work
'2 Merivale 441. 3 Full Reprint zoo8 (1720).
3AREOPAGITICA, (Arber's Edition), 48 and 54.
For an interesting account of the restraints imposed on printing iee "LICENSERs OF
THE PRE ," 3 DISRAELI'S CURIOSITIES OF LITRATURE, [9th ed.] Moxon 1834.
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for which protection is sought,
4 and if it does not conform to the
4 In Southey v. Sherwood, z Meriv. 435, 35 Full Reprint zoo6. An injunction was
sought to restrain the publication of Wat Tyler. Sir Samuel Romilly for the defendant,
argued that the work, from its libelous tendency was of such a nature that there could
be no copyright in it. Lord ELDON, "After the fullest consideration I remain of the
same opinion as that which I entertained in deciding the case referred to. (Walcol v.
Walker, 7 Ves. 1, 32 Full Reprint- t.) It is very true that, in some cases, it may oper-
ate so as to multiply copies of mischievous publications by the refusal of the court
to Interfere by restraining them, but to this my answer is that, sitting here as a judge
upon a mere question of property, I have nothing to do with the nature of the prop-
erty, nor with the conduct of the parties, except as it relates to their civil interests, and
if the publication be mischievous, either on the part of the author or the bookseller, it is
not my business to interfere with it." The plaintiff was directed to establish his right
at law.
In Lawrence v. Smith, Jac. 471, 37 Full Reprint 928, the plaintiff had published a
work entitled "Lectures on Physiology, Zoology and the Natural History of Man." The
lectures had been delivered by him at the College of Surgeons. The bill was to restrain
the defendant from selling a pirated edition. The defendant asserted that the book
which both he and the plaintiff were publishing was an immoral work and ought to have
no protection. Lord Eldon characterized the defense as "singular" but declined to
continue the injunction, directing the plaintiff to bring an action, after which, if it were
decided favorably to him he might apply again. "Looking at the general tenour of the
w.ork," he said, "and at many particular parts of it, recollecting that the immortality of
the soul is one of the doctrines of the scriptures, considering that the law does not
give protection to those who contradict the scriptures, and entertaining a doubt, I think
a rational doubt whether this book does not violate that law, I cannot continue the
injunction."
In Murray v. Benbow, Jac. 474n, 37 Full Reprint 929, an injunction to restrain the
piracy of Byron's "Cain" was denied. The Lord Chancellor on reading the work refused
the relief because he thought it contradicted the scriptures. Byron's "Don Juan" was
similarly treated by the Vice Chancellor in 1823. Murray v. Dugdale, 7 Ves. Jr. 2,
32 Full Reprint 2.
On the general subject that there is no property in matter which is libelous or
indecent see DuBost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. 513, where the plaintiff, an artist of con-
siderable reputation exhibited for money at a house in Pall Mall a painting entitled "a
Belle et ]a Bete," or "Beauty and the Beast," which, says the reporter, "was a scandal-
ous libel upon a gentleman of fashion and his lady." Great crowds of people went daily
to see it. The lady portrayed was the sister of the defendant who one morning cut the
picture to pieces. The plaintiff's counsel insisted on the one hand that he was entitled
to the full value of the picture, together with compensation for the loss of the exhibition,
while it was contended on the other that the exhibition was a public nuisance which
everyone had a right to abate by destroying the picture. Lord ELLENSOROUGH: "If it
was a libel upon the persons introduced into it, the law cannot consider it valuable as a
picture. * * * The jury, therefore, in assessing the damages, must not consider this as a
work of art, but must award the plaintiff merely the value of the canvas and paint
which formed its component parts." There was a verdict for the plaintiff in five pounds
damages. See generally on immorality as a defense, Cowan v. Milbourn, L. R. 2 Ex.
230, 16 L. T. 290, where the defendant contracted to let rooms to the plaintiff, after-
wards discovering that they were to be used for the delivery of lectures maintaining
that the character of Christ is defective and His teachings misleading, and that the Bible
is no more inspired than any other book, he refused to allow the use of them. It was
held that the publication of such doctrine was blasphemy, that therefore the purpose
for which the plaintiff intended to use the rooms was illegal and there could be no
recovery.
The printer of an immoral and libelous work cannot maintain an action for his bill
against the publisher who employed him to print it. Paplett v. Stockdale, a C. & P.
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A printer declin.ng to publish a book with a libelous dedication held entitled to
recovery against the author for pnnting the work witbout the delication. Clay v.
Gates, s If. & N. 73.
An action will not lie for the sale of libelous. obscene or immoral prints. Fores
Y. Johnes, 4 Es.). 97.
Gale v. Leckie, 2 Starkie io6, 3 E. C. L. 337. The plaintiffs were booksellers and
publishers, and the defendant had entered into a written contract with them. in which
it was recited that the defendant had then ready for the press a work to be entitled.
"An Historical Inquiry into the Balance of Power in Europe;" and it was agreed that
this work should be published at the sole expense of the plaintiffs, and that the profits
should be divided between the author and publishers; that the defendant should supply
the plaintiffs with the manuscript, and that in case the plaintiffs should decline to pub-
lish a secord edition the defendant should be at liberty to do so without the plaintiff's
interference. It appeared that the work of printing went on to the extent of 336 pages,
when the defendant declined to supply any further materials, signifying upon one occasion,
that his incarceration would be the consequence of his completing the contract, and upon
another, he assigned a ludicrous reason for refusing to proceed, saying that he was
apprehensive of a prosecution by the pope.
Lord ELLENsOIOUoG charging the jury (338): "He says that he withdrew himself
thai he might not subject himself to a prosecution, but without proof to the contrary,
it is to be presumed that the composition was innocent: if. indeed, it had been of a
different nature, he Wight have founded his defence upon that ground; he*might have
said. I now feel convinced that this work cannot be committed to the press with safety,
that it is not a proper one for me to publish, or for you to print; here I will pause and
will proceed no further in that which will place both of us in peril; but are you to
assume all this without evidence when the work itself might have been submitted to you?"
Hime v. Dale, (18o3). 2 Camp. 27n, was an action for pirating the words of a song
called "Abraham Newland." It was urged that the song was libelous-but let counsel
make his own argument. "It (the song) professed to be a panegyric upon money; but
was in reality a gross and nefarious libel upon the solemn administration of British
justice. The object of this composition was, not to satirize folly or to raise the smile
of innocent mirth, but being sung in the streets of the capital, *o excite the indignation
of the people against the sacred ministers of the law, and the awful duties they were
appointed to perform. The mischievous tendency of the production would sufficiently
appear from the following stanza; after hearing which the court would say whether the
non-suit ought to be disturbed.
'The world is inclin'd
To think Justice blind;
Yet what of all that?
She will blink like a bat
At the sight of friend Abraham Newland!
Oh! Abraham Newland! Magical Abraham Newland!
Tho' Justice 'tis known
Can see thro' a mill-stone.
She can't see thro' Abrahm Newland"
Lord ELLENBRouCt;: "If the composition appeared on the face of it to be a libel so
gross as to affect the public morals, I should advise the jury to give no damages. I
know the Court of Chancery on such occasions would grant no injunction. But I
think the present case is not to be considered one of that kind."
LAwRENcE, J.: "The argument used by Mr Garrow on this fugitive piece as being
a libel, would as forcibly apply to The Beggar's Opera, where the language and allusions
are sufficiently derogatory to the administration of public justice."
Abraham Newland was chief cashier of the Bank of England, becoming such in
5782. His signature appeared on all the Bank's notes which were long known as "Abra-
ham Newlands." This cant phrase for money makes the argument that the song was
libelous, understandable.
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judge's notions of propriety in religion, morality or otherwise, 
to
deny relief agatin.t piracy, have been criticised," and it would seem
as if Milton's criticism is the most vigorous and soundest of all. 
It
would be dillicult to improve upon the Areopagitica in this respect.
llowever, the rule ought to be that, outside of perfectly obvious
limitations, a court should protect against piracy any vork of which
the defendant thinks well enough to steal. As has been frequently
pointed out, the denial of relief in a case of this kind does 
not in
any way benefit the public by keeping from them the things 
which
the court may think they should not have, but has the exactly 
oppo-
site effect-it multiplies copies and increases the circulation of some-
thing which the court thinks immoral. The denial of relief 
to the
plaintiff under such circumstances only enhances the evil.
6
Fiction masquerading as news was held by Judge Hough not 
to
be protectable.5 "Decision in this case" he said, "is put upon 
a single
narrow ground-not because other grounds could not be 
found, but
because the point to be stated depends upon a rule of morals. 
There
5Judge STORY says: "The soundness of this general principle can 
hardly admit of a
question. The chief embarrassment and difficulty 
lie in the application of it to particular
cases. If a court of equity, under color of its general 
authority, is to enter upon all
the moral, theological, metaphysical, and political 
inquiries, which, in past times, have
given rise to so many controversies, and in future may well 
be supposed to provoke many
heated discussions; and if it is to decide dogmatically upon 
the character and hearing of
such discussions, and the rights of authors growing out 
of them; it is obvious, that
an absolute Power is conferred over the subject of literary property. 
which may sap the
very foundations on which it rests, and retard, if not entirely suppress, 
the means of
arriving at physical, as well as at metaphysical truths. Thus, for example, 
a judge, who
should happen to believe that the immateriality of the soul. as 
well as its immortality,
was a doctrine clearly revealed in the scriptures, (a point upon which 
very learned and
pious minds have been greatly divided), would deem any work anti-christian 
which should
profess to deny that point, and would refuse an injunction to protect it. So, a' 
judge,
who should be a Trinitarian, might most conscientiously decide against granting 
an in-
junction in favor of an author enforcing Unitarian views; when another judge, of 
oppo-
site opinions, might not hesitate to grant it." EQuITY, Sec. 938.
6 "So the injunction," says Lord CAMPBELL, speaking of Lord Eldon's 
refusal to
enjoin Wat Tyler in Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Meriv. 435, 3, Full Reprint zoo6, "was
refused, and hundreds of thousands of copies of Wat Tyler, at the price of one 
penny,
were circulated over the kingdom." io LIvEs OF THE CHANCELLORS tsth English 
ed.],
2S7; DRONE ON COPYRIGHT, p. 523.
1 Dazies v. Bowes, 209 Fed. 54-55.
To an action for infringing the copyright in a work entitled. "Evening Devotions;
or, the Worship of God in Spirit and in Truth, for every Day in the Year, from the
German of Sturm:" a plea that Sturm was a well-known writer on religious subjects, 
and
that the plaintiff procured H. to write the book in question, as a translation from a work
in the German by Sturm, whereas no such work existed, and, with a view to defraud 
the
public, and obtain a profit to himself, published a title page and preface to the work,
fV'sely representing it to be the genuine production of Sturm:-Held, that 
the plea
disclosed a transaction, on -he part of the plaintiff, in the nature of crimen 
falsi; that
he had no copyright in the work and that the plea afforded a good defence to the action.
WrigM v. T.&tis, I C. B. 893; 14 L. J. C. P. 283; 9 Jur. 946.
COPYRIGHT AND MORALS
never was any copyright in this alleged episode of trial, because it
was printed as news; it was presented to the public as matter of
fact and not of fiction; the readers of the Sun were invited to believe "
it, and Davies substantially admits that he wrote it in the form he
did in order to induce belief. How much belief is to be accorded
to newspaper stories is matter of opinion; but it is a matter of
morals that he who put forth a thing as verity shall not be heard
to allege for profit that it is fiction."
The circumstances under which the controversy arose are i er-
esting. In June, 19o8, Davies (the plaintiff) was in the employ-
ment of the Evening Sun. It was his especial duty to provide the-
atrical news and criticism; he also wrote short stories. At the time
mentioned he wrote and the Sun published under the caption "News
of the Theaters" something which began as follows: "A Massa-
chusetts real life drama which eclipses the plot of 'The Thief'."
"Two men who had missed their connection with a Boston train
last Tuesday morning found themselves in a little interior Massa-
chusetts town with four hours to be killed." Then it is told that'
during the four hours which they had on their hands they wandered
into the village court house. While they were sitting there they saw
a woman put on trial for theft. It appeared that she had actually
stolen for the purpose of providing luxuries, and perhaps comforts,
for the child to which she soon expected to give birth. She ad-
mitted the larceny, whereupon her husband asserted hiiself to be
the thief, and she repudiated his assertion, dramatically exclaiming
that the father of her child was lying to save her. Before. the re-
sult of this court episode could be known the travelers were obliged
to leave and catch their train. The incident, as reported by the
plaintiff in the Sun, was related almost wholly in the third person,
though the language of the woman in asserting her own guilt and
her husband's innocence was put in the first person.
The edition of the Evening Sun containing this' publication was
copyrighted, and in course of time, by a train of circumstances un-
necessary to recite,'attracted the attention of one Kenyon, who said
that he supposed it to be a journalistic statement of an actual occur-
rence. Davies' name appeared at the foot of the column headed
"News of the Theaters" in the New York Sup , and Davies himself
asserted that the tale was not true; that he regarded it as a short
story which he had cast in the form of an actual occurrence because
he thought it more striking. Kenyon testified that out of this tale
in the Sun and much other and more important material, plus his
MICHIGAN LAW REVLEW
own imaginings, he consructed a play called "Kindling." Defendant
was the producer of "Kindling," and Davies sued because, having re-
ceived an assignment of the copyright privileges of the Evening
Sun, he accused Kenyon of unlawful use of the product of his
imagination just related. For the purpose of this decision JudgC
Hough assumed as a fact that "Kindling" contained a substantial
part of the plot of Davies' story, if it be regarded as a story in the
sense of fiction.
A manual of instruction in a system of salesmanship consisting
of a collection of forms of advertisements to be used by 'dealers
in connection with special sales of pianos and players, contained
statements of facts about the sales and their success which could not
possibly be true in all cases, and which in addition were so extrava-
gantly exaggerated as to mislead the public, though held to be a
book ,nd formally copyrighted could not be protected on account of
its fraudulent character. "Extravaganzas" said Judge Maxey,
"may be indulged in by a writer for the purpose of illustration and
to accompihsh the end in view, as exemplified by Don Quixote and
others of a similar nature, and as thus employed they carry convic-
tion to the reader and lend charm and interest to the story. But
advertisements by dealers of tneir wares, in order to insure the
protection of the law, should reflect the truth and avoid misrepre-
sentations which mislead and deceive the people. If their tendency
be misleading and deceptive they will find the door of a court of
equity barred against their admission."
8
(b) Does the work offend public decency?
This inquiry places the courts in the rather delicate, or perhaps
indelicate, position of deciding what is an indecent work. As far
back in 1826, Chief Justice Abbott refused to protect from piracy
a book entitled "Memoirs of Harriette Wilson," which professed to
be the history of the amours of a courtesan, containing, according
to the Chief Justice, "in some parts matter highly indecent, and in
others, matter of a slanderous nature on persons named in the
work."'
sStone & McGarrick v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 Fed. 837, affirming 21o Fed. z99.
'Stockdale v. Onwhvn. 7 D. & R. 6a.. 4 L. T. K. B. (0. S.) 122. 2 Carr. & P. 163.
5 B. & C. 174, xo8 Full Reprint 65.
Brougham argued: "The doctrine that a publisher can have no property in such a,
work as that which the defendant is alleged to have pirated, rests entirely upon the
dictum of EyiE, C. J., in a case tried before him at Warwick. In Walcott v. Walker,
(7 Ves. Jun. x), and Southey v. Sherwoood (2 Mer. 43S), Lord ELoON relied upon it,
when he refused to arant an iniunction to restrain the sale of copies of what he con-
sidered immoral works." * "The objects with which the courts have been in-
clined to refuse their protection to such works, has been to put them down, hut it seems
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In 1867 Judge Deady held that "The Black Crook" was a com-
position, the producticn of which would not "'promote the progress
of science and useful arts" and he.'ce, not entitled to copyright.
"Now it cannot be denied," said the court, "that this spectacle of
'The Black Crook' only attracts a*tention as it panders to a pruri-
ent curiosity or an obscene imagination by very questionable exhibi-
tions and attitudes of the female person." The Court continued,
"The Black Crook is a mere spectacle-in the language of the craft
a spectacular piece. The dialogue is very scant and meaningless,
and appears to be a mere accessory to the action of the piece-a sort
of verbal machinery tacked on to a succession of ballet and tab-
leaux. The principal part and attraction of the spectacle seems to
be the exhibition of women in novel dress or no dress, and in attrac-
tive attitudes or action. The closing scene is called Paradise, anld as
witness Hamilton expresses it, consists mainly 'of women lying
about loose'-a sort of Mohammedan paradise, I suppose with imi-
tation grottos and unmaidenly houris. To call such a spectacle a
'dramatic composition' is an abuse of language, and an insult to the
genius of the English drama. A menagerie of wild beas-s, or an
exhibition of model artistes might as justly be called a dramatic
composition. Like those, this is a spectacle, and although it may be
an attractive or gorgeous one, it is nothing more. In my judgment.
an exhibition of women 'lying about loose' or otherwise" (Note the
word "otherwise." Here the moralist gives way to the lawyer.' The
clear that the sale must be increased by allowing the publication of pirated editions. And.
accordingly, we find conflicting opinions as to the propriety of granting injuncerions to
restrain piracy. 'The Beggar's Opera' has never been considered a very moral pro, c-
tion; another opera, called "Polly," was composed by the same author, but the perform.
ance of it was prohibited; it must, therefore, be presumed to have been more immoral
than the former, yet Lord Chancellor Talbot ganted an injunction to restrain the sale
of a pirated edition. Upon the whole, therefore, it appears that there is not any decision
of a Court of Law against the present action, and that in equity there are conflicting
opinions of different Chancellors as to the expediency of granting injunctions in such
cases,"
ABSOTT, C. J.: "The question then is, whether the first publisher can claim a com-
pensation in damages for a loss sustained by an injury done to the sale of such a work.
In order to establish such a claim he must. in the first place, shew a right to sell; ftr
if he has not that right he cannot sustain any loss by an injury to the sale. Now I am
certain no lawyer can say that the sale of each copy of this work is not an offence
against the law. How then can we hold that bv the first iublication of such a work. a
right of action can be given against any person who afterwards i,hmlh.- it" It is
said that there is no decision of a Court of Law against the tilaisitiff'% l mi But upon
the plainest principles of the common law, founded as it is. where thi're ar. no authori-
ties, upon common sense and justice, this action cannot be maintained. It would he a
disgrace to the common law could a doubt be entertained upon the subject: but I think
that no doubt can be entertained, and I want no authority for pronouncing such a
judicial opinion."
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court does not intend to permit any lying about of any description.)
"is not a dramatic composition, and therefore not entitled to the pro-
tection of the copyright act. On this ground the application of Ma-
guire et al. for an injunction is denied, with costs."
1
This case probably is no more than a reflection of contemporary
public opinion. The "Black Crook" with its plenitude of pink flesh-
ings, scandalous as it may have seemed in the days of crinolines
when legs-unless their very existence was genteelly denied-were
vehicles, not spectacles, would probably bore a sophisticated mod-
ern audience, but would scarcely shock them. It would only make
the tired business man tireder.
Times have changed. Martinetti v. Maguire was decided in
1867. In go90 the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit
sustained a judgment for $2075 for 2075 sheets of a lithographed
poster advertising the "Black Crook" alleged to be made in violation
of copyright. Necessarily the court must have considered the copy-
right valid,", and on the authority of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lith.
"o,3artinetti v. Maguire, (1867) Deady, 2z6, Fed. Cas. 9173.
In his sketch of William Wheatley, William Winter refers to his production 
of the
"Black Crook." "His introduction of the Leg Drama of the "Black Crook" 
upon the
American stage was mischievous. That piece represented a style of amusement 
that has
intermittently prevailed in the English speaking theatre from the days of 
Sir William
Davenant, and Wheatley cannot be charged with having invented it. The 
sensual spec-
tacle, however, is a kind of theatrical display that has done injury, and it is 
deplorable
that his name was ever associated with its evil influence."
The Wallet of Time.
Shook v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366. CURTISS, J., (p. 368): "The defendants further ob-
ject that the play of 'Rose Michel' is an immoral production, and, consequently, that
if the plaintiffs have any rights in regard to it, that they are not entitled to be protected
in them by the interference of a court of equity. If this play, or any literary 
produc-
tion. is of that character, it is no part of the office of this court to protect 
it by in-
junction or otherwise. The rights of the author are secondary to the right of the public,
to be protected from what is subversive of good morals. But the examination 
of the
original manuscripts fails to show that either version is amenable to this charge."
In Egbert v. Greenberg, 1oo Fed. 447, a copyrighted "racing form" was alleged 
to
have been pirated. It was unsuccessfully urged in defense that a racing form 
was a
gambling device and immoral.
In Richardson v. Miller, 12 0. G. 3, IS ALn. L. JoUR. 34o, Fed. Cas. 11791, 
Judge
Shepley held that the copyright for a design for playing cards was not invalid. 
"Courts of
Justice will not lend their aid to protect the authors of immoral works. 
But where
there is nothing immoral or improper in the prints themselves, the fact that 
they may
be used by persons to violate the laws against gambling, does not of itself 
deprive them
of the protection of the law. To do this it must appear either that there is something
immoral, pernicious, or indecent in the things per se, or that they are incapable 
of any
use except in connection with some illegal and immoral act. It is not contended that
the playing cards of the complainant are subject to either of these imputations."
See also, Novelty Co. v. Dworzek, 8o Fed. 902; National Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40
Fed. 89.
UHe.ceman v. Sprinaer, 11o Fed. 374-
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Co."2 the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court.13 If "Black
Crook" posters run true to form, these undoubtedly contained rep-
resentations of the scenes which so acutely shocked Judge Deady,
13
1
and if the representation of a thing is the subject of copyright, it
is difficult, unless there is some other objection to it, to understand
why the thihg itself may not be. If a life size colored picture of a
woman in tights is not immodest, how, speaking of course legally
and considering her as a work of art only, can the lady herself
be fairly the subject of judicial reproach. Indeed the Supreme
Court has said: "'The ballet is as legitimate a subject for illus-
tration as any other. .A rule cannot be laid down that will ex-
communicate the paintings of Degas."
In discussing that immortal lyric "Dora Dean," Judge Morrow
held that the word "hottest" in the line "She's the hottest thing
you ever seen," as applied to a female colored person, had an in-
delicate and vulgar meaning and refused the song protection, al-
though he intimated that if the objectionable word were omitted
the complainant might establish a locus penitentiae and return to
a court of equity."
A performance containing among other things, moving pictures
of a woman making quick changes of costumes and incidentally
exhibiting considerable portions of her anatomy, was decided by
Judge Ray to be "immoral and not tending to promote the progress
of science and useful arts." The defendant performer was a man.
The Court in comparing the two exhibitions observed: "The only
close similarity is in changing clothes or costumes and the conse-
.quent exposure of the person-the one the exposure of the female
person, conveying certain sensations and impressions; and the other
the exposure of the male person, conveying entirely different sen-
sations and impressions. Should these exposures alone actually
be made, the first would bring a large and enthusiastic crowd (of
men)-while the second would bring the police only-possibly a few
courtesans. Society may tolerate and even patronize such exhibi-
tions, but Congress has no constitutional authority to enact a law
that will copyright them."' 5
One might almost fancy he was reading Prynne's "Histriomas-
tix," Jeremy Collier's "Short View of the Profaneness and Im-
2 x88 U. S. 239.
12z89 U. S. SoS.
2s An inspection of the record in the Supreme Court discloses that this surmise is
correct-they do.
4Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co.. 88 Fed. 74.
55 Barnes v. Aliner. 122 Fed. 480.
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morality of the English Stage,""6 or Macaulay paying his respects
to the dramatists of the Restoration.
A vaudeville monologue perpetrated by a person calling himself
"The German Senator" contained such passages as "It gives me
great pleasure and joy to stand and undress myself before this
large aggravation. I stand before you with an open face and a
free mind, a poor, honest, sterilized citizen. As soon as a child
reaches the age of six we send him off to school and he granulates,
goes to scollege for ten years, and when he gets through he gets
a job as a school teacher at $6o per month and when the janitor
of the same school is getting $go a month. The Prohibitionists are
progressing more and more every day. They are closing up every
saloon in the country. You can't get in any saloon on Sunday. It
is impossible; it's too crowded. You know it is drink that breaks
up many a home. At last a woman comes out with a great idea,
1, "Early in the days of William people began to discover how wicked their fathers
were, and Jeremy Collier published a little book which is one of the curiosities of liter-
ature. It purported to be a 'short view of the stage'; it was actually a collectidn from
Congreve, Wycherly, and Dryden of all the passages considered by Collier to be the
most profane and obscene. Collier, in fact, adopted the method of all respectable pam-
phleteers and newspapers, which contrive to make the best of both worlds, offering the
public wares he held to be unfit for sale, and disguising the exact nature of the under-
taking with righteousness in the margin." THE CENSOR AND THE THEATRES, by John
Palmer, (Unwin, 7912).
Collier's book was published in 1698.
Macaulay, in his review of Leigh Hunt's "Comic Dramatists," says that Collier
was complete master of the rhetoric of honest indignation, ar-i that the Short View is
now much less read than it deserves. One is disposed to share the regret that Collier's
book is not better known, perhaps not for the reason which Macaulay evidently had in
mind.
"Their liberties," Collier says of the theatres. "in the following particulars are in-
tolerable, viz: Their smuttiness of expression, Swearing, Profaneness and Lewd applica-
tion of scripture; their abuse of the clergy; their making their Top Characters Libertines
and giving them success in their debauchery. This charge, with some other irregu-
larities I shall make good against the stage and shew both the Novelty and Scandal
of the Practice, and first, I shall begin with the Rankness and Indecency of their langu-
age." No one escapes, "The Country Wife." "The Plaindealer." "The Old Bachelor,"
"The Relapse." even "Hamlet." "Had Shakespeare secured this point for his young
Virgin Ophelia, the play had been better contrived. Since he was resolved to drown the
Lady like a Kitten, he should have set her a swimming a little sooner. To keep her
alive only to sully her Reputation, and discover the Rankness of her Breath, was very
cruel."
And as to swearing-"They swear in solitude and cool blood, under Thought and
Deliberation, for Business and for Exercise. This is a terrible circumstance."
"However, now we know the Reason of the Profaneness and Obscenity of the stage,
of their Hellish Cursing and Swearing, and in -hort of their great Industry to make God
and Goodness contemptible. 'Tis all to satisfie the company, and make people laugh. * *
* Innocence is no such easy matter. There is no succeeding in this matter without Sweat
and Drudgery. Clean wit, inoffensive Humor and handsome Contrivance require Time-
and Thought, and who would be at this expence, when the Purchase is so cheap another
way?"
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a wives' union, think of it, a union for wives. A young couple gets
married and just as soon as they get settled down a walking dele-
gate comes out and orders a strike. Just imagine hundreds and
thousands of wives walking the streets and scabs taking their
places." The similarities in the defendant's monologue of which
the plaintiff complained consisted of such things as describing eggs
as "in their second childhood," referring to the "house of misrep-
resentatives," and the like, which were claimed to be original with
the plaintiff, highly meritorious, and appropriated by the defend-
ant. Judge Ray thought that the merit and morality of plaintiff's.
monologue was so doubtful as to require the denial of a preliminary
injunction.'
Mrs. Glyn sought to restrain, as an infringement of her novel
"Three Weeks" the exhibition of burlesque moving picture films
under the title of "Pimple's Three Weeks (without the Option)."
It was naturally contended by the defendant that the plaintiff's book
was an immoral work. Mr. Justice Younger delivered a written
judgment in which, among other things, he said :'a "More impor-
tant from a public point of view was the further fact that in his
lordship's opinion the plaintiff's work was of a -highly immoral
tendency, and on this ground even if there had been an infringe-
ment, was disentitled to the protection of the Court. Moreover,
the films themselves in his opinion contained incidents and move-
ments of an indecently offensive character, which would equally
have disentitled them in their present form to the protection of the
Court in an action for infringement; and since in a copyright action
the plaintiff was- in the position of a person adopting and claiming
the benefit derived from the infringing work, this ground too was
fatal to the plaintiff's case. Under the circumstances the action
must be dismissed without costs on either side."
The question seems not to have been raised in a case where the
subject matter was a photograph of a nude model called the "Grace
of Youth."'"
Upon principles of unfair trading, not of copyright, protection
was given to the Old Sleuth series of youthful memory, including
"Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 Fed. 375.
OGlyn v. Western Feature Film Company, (Jan. x. zgx6) Weekly Notes 196, S.
The same conclusion was reached and the same disposition of the case as to costs was
made by Mr. Justice Kekewich, in Baschet v. London Illustrated Standard Company,
[&goo]. r Ch. 73, 79, where two of seven pictures were held indecent and disentitled to
protection. The defendant had pirated all seven. "But" said the court, "the defendants
are in par delicto in that respect." The defendants were ordered to pay five-sevenths
of the costs.
"Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 9.o. 230 Fed. 412.
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one entitled "Old Sleuth's Own," "Dudie Dunne or The Exquisite
Detective, by Old Sleuth," which, with its yellow cover was imitated
in defendant's publication "Old Sleuth Series," "That Dangerous
Humpback; Conclusion of Desperate Larry, by Old Sleuth.
'20
Cases where spectacular pieces were refused copyright protec-
tion on account of their supposed immodesty are reminiscent
of some of the incidents related by Mrs. Trollope. Her experience
at the "Antique Statue Gallery" at Philadelphia, where it was
thought to be indecent for mixed company to look at the statues.
"Now, ma'am, now," said the attendant, "this is just the time for
you-nobody can see you-make haste."-When picnics were dis-
couraged because it was considered very indelicate for ladies and
gentlemen to sit down together on the grass, and a young foreigner
greatly offended "one of the principal families" by having pro-
nounced the word "corset" before the ladies of it. Mrs. Trollope
tells of a garden at Cincinnati where people went to eat ices and
look at the roses. At the end of one of the walks there was a sign
representing a Swiss peasant girl requesting that the roses might
not be gathered: "Unhappily for the artist, or for the proprietor,
or for both, the petticoat of this figure was so short as to show her
ancles. The ladies saw, and shuddered; and it was formally inti-
mated to the proprietor, that if he wished for the patronage of the
ladies of Cincinnati, he must have the petticoat of this figure length-
ened. The affrighted purveyor of ices sent off an express for the
artist and his paint pot. He came, but unluckily not provided with
any colour that would match the petticoat; the necessity, however,
was too urgent for delay, and a flounce of blue was added to the
petticoat of red, giving bright and shining evidence before all men
of the immaculate delicacy of the Cincinnati ladies."
Then there was the incident at the Cincinnati theatre where Mrs.
Trollope says the men sat in boxes in their shirt sleeves, and that
their bearing and attitudes were "perfectly indescribable ;"-"the
heels thrown higher than the head, the entire rear of the person
presented to the audience, the whole length supported on the
benches, are among the varieties that these exquisite posture-masters
exhibit. The noises, too, were perpetual, and of the most unpleasant
kind; the applause is expressed by cries and thumping with the
feet, instead of clapping; and when a patriotic fit seized them and
'Yankee Doodle' was called for, every man seemed to think his
reputation as a citizen depended on the noise he made."
"Two very indifferent figurantes, probably from the Ambigu
Comique, or la Gaiet6, made their appearance at Cincinnati while
2 J. S. Ogiavie Pub. Co. v. Royal Pub. Co., 241 Penn. S.
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we were there; and had Mercury stepped down and danced a pas
seul upon earth, his godship could not have produced a more violent
sensation. But wonder and admiration were by no means the only
feelings excited; horror and dismay were produced in at least an
equal degree. No one, I believe, doubted their being admirable
dancers, but every one agreed that the morals of the Western world
would never recover the shock, When I was asked if I had ever
seen anything so dreadful before I was embarrassed how to an-
swer; for the young women had been exceedingly careful, both 
in
their dress and in their dancing, to meet the taste of the people;
but had it been Virginie in her most transparent attire, or Taglioni
in her most remarkable pirouette, they could not have been more
reprobated. The ladies altogether forsook the theatre; the 
gentle-
men muttered under their breath, and turned their heads aside 
when
the subject was mentioned; the clergy denounced them 
from the
pulpit; and if they were named at the meetings of the saints, 
it was
to show how deep the horror such a theme could produce. 
I could
not but ask myself if virtue were a plant, thriving under one 
form
in one country, and flourishing under a different one in 
another?
If these Western Americans are right then how dreadfully 
wrong
are we? It is really a very puzzling 
subject." 21
This point of view may represent an American survival of 
that
Puritanism which Macaulay describes. "Nymphs and 
Graces, the
work of Ionian chisels, were delivered over to Puritan stone-masons
to be made decent. Against the lighter vices the ruling 
faction
waged war with a zeal little tempered by humanity 
or by common
sense. Sharp laws were passed. against betting." * * * 
"Public
amusements, from the masques which w.ere exhibited at 
the man-
sions of the great, down to the wrestling matches and 
grinning
matches on village greens, were vigorously attacked. One 
ordi-
nance directed that all the Maypoles in England should 
forthwith
be hewn down. Another proscribed all theatrical diversions. 
The
playhouses were to be dismantled, the spectators fingd, the 
actors
nDOnmSTIC MANNERS OF THE AMEtiCANS (1832).
The advantage of morality in the show business is well 
illustrated by A. Ward's
celebrated letters to the Cleveland Plain Dealer. "My 
show," he wrote in one of them.
"at present consists of three Moral Bares, a Kangaroo 
(a amoozin little Raskal-t'would
make you larf yerself to deth to see the little cuss 
jump up and squeal), wax iggers of
G. Washington Gen. Taylor John Bunyan Capt. Yidd 
and Dr. Webster in the act of
killin Dr.. Parkman, besides several miscelanyus moral 
wax statoots of celebrated piruts
& murderers, &c. ekalled by few & exceld by none. Now, 
Mr. Editor, scratch off a few
lines sayin how is the show bizniss down to your place. 
I shall have my hanbills dun
at your ofis. Depend upon it. I want you should 
git my hanbills up in flamin stile.
Also git up a tremenjus excitement in yr. paper 'bout 
my onparaleld show. We must
fetch the public sumbow. We must work on their 
feelins. Cur the moral on em
strong."
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whipped at the cart's tail. Rope dancing, puppet shows, bowls,horse-racing, were regarded with no friendly eye. But bearbaiting,
then a favorite diversion of high and low, was the abomination
which most strongly stirred the wrath of the austere sectaries. Itis to be remarked that their antipathy to this sport had nothingin common with the feeling which has, in our own time, induced thelegislature to interfere for the purpose of protecting beasts againstthe wanton cruelty of men. The Puritan hated bearbaiting, not be-cause it gave pain to the bear, but because it gave pleasure to the
spectators."
22
There is a very vital distinction between a published and anunpublished work respecting the defense of immorality. In thecase of a published work in the United States the constitutionallimitation, that the work must tend to promote the progress ofscience and useful arts, must be given effect, and if the work isimmoral (giving the author the benefit of every doubc) it does nottend to promote the progress of science and useful arts. NeitherCongress, nor the courts, therefore, have jurisdiction to protect it.Where, however, it is sought to prevent the unauthorized publica-
tion of an unpublished work, neither- the constitutional limitationnor the copyright statute has any application, and the morality ofthe work itself ought not to be in question. The plaintiff in such acase is not seeking, by the publication and sale of his work, todebauch the public, because he has not p ublished. He is simplyseeking to enjoin some one else from publishing an unpublished
work without his consent: If he (the plaintiff) subsequently pub-
lishes a work which is immoral and tries to profit by it, or seeksto make some one else account for the gains of such an unlawfulpublication, it is time enough for the court then to discuss the
morality or immorality of the subject matter, but no reason isapparent why John Wilkes, provided he had not himself published,could not have restrained a bookseller who had surreptitiously ob-tained a copy of it, from publishing even the Essay on Woman, andrelief in such a case might be placed on a principle which is fre-
quently invoked-that a man has a right to determine not only whenand how his work shall be published, but whether it shall be pub-
lished at all.2"
EDWARD S. ROGERS.
Chicago, Ill.
- HISTORY, Chap. II.
2 COPINGER ON COPYRIGHT, [4th ed.] .5. Lord Eldon seems not to IHave had thisdistinction in mind deciding Southey v. Sherwood, 2 M6feriv. 435, a5 Full Reprint xoo6.See DRONE ON COPYRIGHT. DP. iix-zx.: SHORTT COPYRIGHT & LIBEL, [2nd ed.] p. 6.
